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By Bola A. Akinterinwa

Francophone Africa used to be considered an exclusive backyard of France in international relations. The exclusiveness of Francophone Africa as backyard is first explained by France’s quest for Grandeur de la France (Greatness of France), the need for France to remain a global power, and the need to respond to the challenges of the Cold War. Thus, the quest required evolving a special relationship with Francophone Africa which is called FrançAfrique.

FrançAfrique, was first used in 1943 by the Editor-in-Chief of l’Aurore newspaper, Jean Piot, to imply the strategy of uniting France and Africa with the ultimate objective of renewing and strengthening French empire. This conception was redefined in 1955 by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, to make it look good, rather than condoning it as a negative re-colonisation. Houphouët-Boigny defined it as celebration of shared language, economic, and cultural values. However, in the eyes of François Xavier Verschave, FrançAfrique was an embodiment of a very fraudulent or corrupt system. As he put it, ‘FrançAfrique symbolized a shadowy system of corruption, patronage and political interference.’

In spite of this, France could not and still cannot sustain her needed great power status without carrying the former colonies along. FrançAfrique was therefore re-coined Franco-African Summit and Jacques Foccart, who was a major player in the making and execution of FrançAfrique, still continued with the implementation of Franco-African Summit policy. Foccart was not only African Affairs advisor to the French President, from 1958 to 1974, but also an advisor to Prime Minister Jacques Chirac between 1986 and 1988. Franco-African Summits underscored partnerships and gave the impression of non-domination by France even though the instruments of French hegemony were still manifest.

With the emergence of troubled misunderstanding between France, on the one hand, and Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, on the other hand, over France’s inability to contain jihadism in the Sahel, and particularly, France’s active support for the ECOWAS sanctions over unconstitutional changes of government in the three countries, relationship with France has been severely damaged. This is the background to the 2026 FrançAfriquess Forward Summit.

The 2026 France-Africa Forward Summit

The first issue that is noteworthy in the 2026 France-Africa Forward Summit is the name. ‘France-Africa Forward Summit’ is the new name for Franco-African Summit that was introduced in 1973 by the late French President, George Pompidou. The concept of Franco-African Summit, as noted earlier, replaced the usage of FrançAfrique, which was predicated on many pillars. It should therefore not be confused with the 2026 name which is consciously to close the chapter of Franco-African relations and open a new framework of relationship.

First, Franco-African Summit has a pillar of military interventions, which involved the signing of bilateral accords with pro-France countries. The bilateral accords were to defend and sustain the friendly governments. France often assist them to continue to stay in power by different lawful and unlawful means. Operation Manta in Chad and Operation Serval in Mali are good illustrations of this observation. 

When the name FrançAfrique became politically controversial, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Cõte d’Ivoire first used FrançAfrique to promote Franco-African closer rapprochement. Emphasis was particularly placed on Franco-African partnerships that were promoted from 1955 until 1998 when François Xavier Verschave, a social activist, redefined it to condemn France’s interventionist neo-colonial system. Verschave saw FrançAfrique as secretive and corrupt. In his eyes, FrançAfrique was nothing more than French neo-colonialism. Africans have become much suspicious about neo-colonialism as shown in the anti-France sentiments in the ASS countries. This explains why Emmanuel Macron has to design the 2026 summit differently. For instance, Aljazeera had it that ‘France’s influence in Africa has faded.’ This is a truism and Macron appears to be much aware of it. This is one reason why Macron is trying to lay a new foundation for restoring French influence without any jot of arrogance.

Attitudinally, he is not only courting a special relationship with Nigeria’s President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) but also boasted before the summit took place that PBAT would attend the Kenya Summit. And true enough, PBAT attended, flying directly from Paris to Nairobi. Additionally, Macron has been presenting himself as a true friend of Africa who really wants to help Africa. As he put it, ‘we are not simply here to come and invest on the African continent and alongside you – we need great African business leaders to come and invest in France.’ Macron has always given the impression of feeling at home whenever he is in Africa, especially having worked in the Embassy of France in Lagos before he became President of France. At the Kenyan summit, the  has it that Macron ‘is betting on business to shake off its colonial baggage.’ More importantly, ‘he cooked with a Kenyan influencer and ran with Eliud Kipchoge, a long-distance runner. He even danced to a live performance of Jerusalema, a South African hit. Emmanuel Macron’s trip to Kenya from May 10th to May 12th certainly felt different.’

Participation wise, more than 7,000 participants were there. In terms of issues raised, they were basically as raised by Macron in 2017 in his transformation of the partnership: promotion of mutually beneficial partnerships on an equal footing. According to the , the issues are about ‘promoting mutually beneficial partnerships on an equal footing; forging ties through our youth and our diasporas; encouraging the scaling up of private investment on the African continent to address financing needs (development, climate, etc.), and facing our shared history head-on, through the unprecedented work undertaken since 2017 on memory and the restitution of cultural property looted during the colonial period’

More importantly, the Elysée said that ‘€23 billion in investments in Africa have been announced, corresponding to the creation of more than 250 direct jobs in France and Africa, and many more indirect jobs. Of the €23 billion, €14 billion are French investments in Africa; €9 billion are African investments in Africa’ (). And most importantly, the French have made it clear that ‘by making the mobilisation of private capital in Africa a priority, the Africa Forward Summit builds, in particular, on the Paris Summit on the Financing of African economies in 2021, the Paris summit for a New Global Financing Pact in 2023, and the African Union-European Union (AU-EU) Summits held in Brussels under the French presidency of the European Union in February 2022 and in Luanda in November 2025. It marks an important step towards ensuring that the voices of African countries are heard ahead of the G-7 Summit in Evian in June 2026.’

Of what use will the voices of African countries be at the G-7 summit in its true sense of it? To an extent, Macron may be right by positing that ‘the challenges faced in Africa and in Europe are the same’ and that ‘we want peace, prosperity and sovereignty.’ Are the challenges really the same? Which countries in Europe want prosperity for Africa? What is the policy of the European countries on migration from Africa? Emmanuel Macron has also said that ‘Europe has fought for peace, prosperity and sovereignty. ‘Following the Second World War, it built the European Union, first to ensure peace, then formed the common market to ensure prosperity. Today, the European agenda is one of strategic autonomy, so as not to depend on Chinese or American domination and try to stick to a middle path in line with international law.’  This point is interesting. However, if France does not want dependence on the Americans and on the Chinese why should Africans be made dependent on France or on the European Union? As told by Macron, what the French want to do is not to bring aid. That approach is a thing of the past. We can see that many countries of the north, some on ideological grounds, some due to fiscal difficulties, are no longer delivering the planed aid. That is a reality. We must bring greater clarity to relations between the North and South.’ This is the first basis of the intellection provided by President Macron at the 2026 Summit. 

Emmanuel Macron’s New Intellection

One cannot easily comprehend President Macron’s new intellection on the matter without first expatiating on the implications of both FrançAfrique and Franco-African Summit policies. It should be recalled that FrançAfrique is predicated on a pentagonal legs: African Cell in which the French President, his close advisers and the French Secret Services are only involved; the leg of Franc Zone, according to which the currencies of most Francophone Africa are pegged to the French Franc; Cooperation frameworks, which are basically a series of agreements that facilitate political, economic, military and cultural ties between France and Africa; Stability guarantor, which makes France an enabler and guarantor of regional stability; and more importantly, Personal Networking, which is about personal diplomacy on the basis of one-on-one relationship with African leaders.

And for various reasons, FrançAfrique entered into désuétude. One of the reasons is the factor of Cold War which ended in 1989. The end of the Cold War made the use of Africa not as compelling as of when the Cold War was active. The end of the war raised the relevance of Africa as a source of raw materials for the development of Europe and to which Nigeria’s Commissioner of External Affairs, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, was vehemently opposed. 

Another reason was the deepening budgetary constraints in France. Francophone African leaders want aid, either because of the argument of one school of thought that emphasis should be placed on development aid from France as a means of French pay back for colonial exploitation or because of arguments of unavoidable principles of interdependence. Put differently, the factor of political independence of many colonial dependencies has necessarily reduced the direct control of France over financial mineral resources of the countries.

Besides, the factor of France being an original Member of the European Economic Community that evolved into the European Community, and then to the European Union,s created many obligations for France to tow common policies which curtailed the free hands of France in Francophone Africa. This factor was made more difficult with the death of the major implementers of the policy, such as Jacques Foccart and François Mitterrand. In the absence of the catalytic agents, FrançAfrique cannot but be thrown into the garbage of history. If it is equally borne in mind that the management and conduct of the FrançAfrique was fraught with corruption under President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in Africa, there was no way the need for an alternative policy attitude would not have remained a desideratum. President d’Estaing was accused in 1979 by Le Canard Enchain, a satiric French newspaper of having received large quantity of gold and diamond from Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic who was supported by the French Government and who was accused of unnecessarily lavishing public funds on his coronation.

 France adopted the new policy of making changes within continuity. The changes are tactical in operation, and therefore are constantly changing, while the ultimate objective is continual. France’s hegemonic influence is to be sustained while the tactical means of ensuring the hegemony often change. To begin with, the name of FrançAfrique was changed to Franco-African Summit with a new content. The first Franco-African Summit took place in Paris in 1973 with the Franc Zone and Euro-African relations as thematic focus. The 1975 Summit was held in Bangui, Central Africa Republic, and it focused on African economic problems. Dakar, Senegal, played host to the 1977 summit which focused on African security questions. The Summit of 1980, held in Nice in southern France, was quite notable as it addressed the establishment of a ‘Francophone Community.’ The 2010 Summit that also took place in Nice, addressed Africa’s role in global governance.

As good as these developments might have been, discontent with France’s behavior and exploitations in Francophone Africa has not ceased. This largely prompted President Emmanuel Macron in his 2017 speech in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to re-define Franco-African Summit to underscore economic partnership, innovation, and co-construction of projects. The re-definition of the format of the Summit requires involving non-Francophone countries. In fact, the ties with Africa have been strategically expanded. The definition of the ties allows for the holding of the summit outside of the Francophone world. In this regard, the 2026 Kenya summit was the first time such a summit would take place outside of France and the Francophone world.

Like the 9-10 October 2021 France-Africa Summit, that took place in Montpellier in France during which the door was opened to a new generation of African youths and the diaspora to have an open and direct discussion with President Macron, so was the case in 2026 Summit. As noted by Aymar N. Bisoka, David Mwambari, and Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni in their article entitled “From Summit to counter-summit: imperialism, FrançAfrique and decolonization,” in Review of African Political Economy of 13 December 2021, ‘for the first time in history, the summit between France and African countries was held with no African Head of State.’

And perhaps most interestingly, if not disturbingly, President Macron approached the Cameroonian historian and political scientist, Achille Mbembe, to prepare a report for ‘the New Africa-France Summit, on 9 and 10 October 2021.’ And most significantly, ‘as part of the preparation for the summit, Mbembe had to lead a series of discussions in twelve African countries and the diaspora, ahead of the actual event, around themes of common interest.’ As explained by Mbembe, ‘the aim of these discussions with African and diaspora youth was to ‘directly and openly question the fundamentals of this relationship and to redefine it together.’ And true enough, four days to the commencement of the summit, Mbembe submitted a ‘140-page report containing thirteen proposals for ‘refoundation’ of relations between France and Africa. These proposals focus on an innovation Fund for Democracy, a House of African and Diaspora Views, migration, employment, intercontinental economic transparency, the transformation of development aid, the voice of Africa on climate change, the narrative of Africa, the rethinking of the relations between Africa and Europe, the restitution of stolen works of art, among others.’ 

This quotation raises many questions and interesting issues that informed the holding of the 2026 France-Africa Forward Summit held in Kenya. First, why was the Franco-African Summit given a new name: not Franco-African Summit but France-Africa Summit? Why was there no African president? Were the youths invited really the leaders of the groups or they were chosen on the basis of whims and caprices? If Achille Mbembe had been unfriendly or he was a critique of French colonialism, would he have qualified to be called upon to organize the African youths? These questions are necessary in light of the fact that Senegalese youth protested against the French and vandalized several French interests (Shops, Petrol stations, super markets, etc.) in Senegal in March 2021. The names of those who were involved in the protest did not figure on the list of people to be invited to have dinner with President Macron at the summit.

Whatever the answers, the undeniable truth is that Emmanuel Macron is using Africans to identify African problems, to make suggestions on how to address the same problems, to go and consult with many youths in more than ten countries in Africa, and then ask for a report to be considered and possibly approved for implementation. The mother of all the questions here is why should anyone seek to blame France for using Africans to perpetuating French hegemony in Africa? An intellectual can be asked to provide intellection assistance, but in which area of assistance? Is there anything wrong seeking to promote cooperation between and among youths of different countries? If there is nothing wrong with it, how do we ensure that the cooperation is not about mental recolonization? Let us now address the 2026 France-Africa Forward Summit. 

 The 2026 summit, co-chaired by President Emmanuel Macron and the President of Kenya, William Ruto, was quite interesting from many perspectives. Participation involved different stakeholders: young people, artists, civil society organisations, etc. Unlike the 2021 summit in which there were no Heads of State, several Heads of State attended the 2026 summit. Secondly, the Summit de-emphasised traditional approach and aid in the new relationship to the advantage of co-investment, industrialization, digital partnerships, and ‘Made in Africa’ products. Seven main priorities were identified in the Nairobi Declaration of priorities: renewable energy/green industrialization, AI/digital infrastructure, agriculture, healthcare manufacturing, critical minerals, maritime trade, and AfCFTA integration. 

Thirdly, the Summit discussed the issue of security and development, as well as economic initiatives in the Sahel. Before France was declared unwanted in the ASS countries, France could not solve the problem of insecurity and particularly the Touareg insurrection. Terrorism was on the increase which was one major reason for the extension of invitation to France to come and help in 2013. What is the magic that France wants to perform within the new framework to positively address the problem of insecurity?

Fourthly, even though the 2026 Africa Forward Summit is a part of a larger and ongoing reconfiguration of new French strategy in Africa, the tactical French strategy is to first foster a better understanding with Anglophone Africa, and possibly strengthen ties with the leading Commonwealth countries. If this strategy were to work, how will the Member States of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) react to the development? How should the regional organisations, and particularly the ECOWAS, react to a better France-Africa relationship that is detrimental to the interests of the ASS? Will it not amount to another divide and rule? More disturbingly, the governments of the ASS were not invited to the summit because of the African Union sanctions against the ASS for their engagement in unconstitutional changes of government in their countries. Besides, the ASS countries have strained their relationships with France. The problem here is that the representatives of the civil society organisations were invited and they all attended. Is this not dividing the people? What is the gain for the African Union in creating a wedge between the governments and their people under the pretext of democracy?

President Emmanuel Macron’s 3-point message to all African peoples and their governments at the 2026 France-Africa Forward Summit is very thought-provoking. First, when he was leaving Paris for Nairobi, he reminded that ‘colonialism can no longer be blamed for all Africa’s challenges. We must not exonerate from all responsibility the seven decades that followed independence.’ In other words, if colonialism was responsible for Africa’s setbacks before 1960, should the former colonialists still be held responsible for Africa’s internal wars, political chicanery, poor governance, etc.? This means that Africans should be more responsible in addressing their problems. Macron supports the idea of allowing African problems to be resolved by Africans themselves. A second message is that investments should not be unidirectional, that it should be in both directions: from France to Africa and from Africa to France. Macron has pledged $27 billion worth investments in Africa. This is encouraging. If African leaders can boast of this type of amount, would there have been any need for the summit? Can Kenya have peace in the near future in light of the signing of a new defence agreement granting French soldiers immunity from Kenyan courts and in light of the existence of 800 French troops in Kenya before the Parliament ratified the agreement? What should the African Union expect in light of the position of the Pan-Africanism Summit against Imperialism that they ‘will not host our executioners. We will not become the new barracks of colonial domination’?  Finally, to what extent can Macron’s intellection change Africa’s perception of France as a neo-colonialist? Is his advice to his audience not to make noise and to be respectful a reflection of the hegemony?